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Abstract
This paper examines how the model of De Fraja [Games and Economic Behavior, 1999] can
be amended after Che [Games and Economic Behavior, 2000] negative result. We mainly
show that the optimal level of investments can be obtained with the specific performance
contract considered by De Fraja if the renegotiation process does not follow the Hart−Moore
procedure but allocates an extreme bargaining power.
I am grateful to Daniel Delalande, David Martimort, Marie−Odile Ogier, Anne Perrot, Pierre Picard, Patrick Rey, and a referee
for helpful comments.
Citation: Fares, M'hand, (2005) "Direct externalities, specific performance and renegotiation design." Economics Bulletin, Vol.
3, No. 27 pp. 1−7
Submitted: February 8, 2005.  Accepted: May 20, 2005.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2005/volume3/EB−05C70008A.pdf1 Introduction
Incomplete contract theory has addressed the issue of how to design the optimal contractual arrange-
ment to achieve the e¢ cient investments in the presence of contract incompleteness (Hart, 1995). In
this theory, incompleteness comes from the parties inability to write complete contingent contract on
all future states of nature and ex ante investments because they are too costly to describe or unveri￿-
able by court (see Tirole, 1999 for a survey). After the relevant state of nature is realized, the parties
may renegotiate the initial contract to implement the e¢ cient outcome. But such ex post renego-
tiation may lead to ine¢ cient investments. This is called under-investment result or the ￿ hold-up
problem￿(Hart-Moore, 1988). The litterature on contract solutions to the hold-up problem (Chung,
1991; Aghion et al., 1994) suggested that the e¢ cient level of investment can be obtained if the
renegotiation process of a speci￿c performance contract is designed so that one party has the whole
bargaining power. However, Che-Hausch (1996) show that these solutions to the hold-up problem
fall through when the investments generate direct externalities, that is when each party￿ s investment
a⁄ects directly the bene￿t or cost of the other party. De Fraja (1999) claimed that this result can
be overturned if the investments are sequentially undertaken and the renegotiation follows the Hart-
Moore (1988) renegotiation procedure1. Che (2000) points out an error in this sequential solution
since the Hart-Moore renegotiation procedure considered implies that the late mover does not get
right incentives to invest. Thus the speci￿c performance contract considered by De Fraja has value
only under restrictive conditions (proposition 3). Therefore, Che suggests an alternative contract
specifying a menu of prices that can solve the hold-up problem.
In contrast to Che, we show that no alternative contract arrangement is needed to achieve e¢ -
ciency. The optimal level of investments can be obtained with a speci￿c performance contract if the
renegotiation process does not follow the Hart-Moore procedure but allocates an extreme bargaining
power (Chung 1991, Aghion et al. 1994). This result implies that the restrictive conditions derived
by Che on the investment e⁄ect are unecessary to implement the e¢ cient result.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 provides
the e¢ cient result. Section 4 contains a further discussion.
1The procedure can be de￿ned as follows: "if a party prefers the original contract to the exchange of the e¢ cient
quantity for the original price, then this party is o⁄ered just enough to make him indi⁄erent between accepting this
new o⁄er and insisting on legal enforcement of the original contract [outside option]. If on the other hand, neither party
perfers the original contract, the e¢ cient output is traded at the original price" (De Fraja, p.29). Since this procedure
is a variant of the Outside-Option Principle (Muthoo, 1999) where both outside options can bind, renegotiation design
(extreme bargaining power allocation to one party such that only her partner￿ s outside option binds) is not possible.
12 Model
2.1 Set-up
Consider a long-term procurement relationship between a buyer (she) and a seller (he), both of whom
are risk neutral. The timing of events is the following. At date 0, the buyer undertakes a speci￿c
investment ￿ 2 [0;1) with a direct cost denoted hB(￿). At date 1, she makes a "take-it-or-leave-it"
o⁄er of a contract specifying a quantity q 2 R+ of the good, and a monetary transfer p 2 R from the
buyer to the seller. At date 2, the seller makes a relationship-speci￿c investment ￿ 2 [0;1) with a
direct cost denoted hS(￿). At date 3, the state of nature ! 2 ￿ is realized. Renegotiation occurs at
date 4, just before trade can take place.
Let v(q;!;￿;￿) be the buyer￿ s (gross) bene￿t of receiving q units of the good when the realized
state of the world is !, and when her level of investment is ￿ and the seller￿ s investment is ￿.
Similarly, let c(q;!;￿;￿) denote the seller￿ s production cost of delivering q units of output when !,
￿ and ￿ are the arguments of the cost function. Investments have an indirect externality since the
investments a⁄ect the probability of trade, but also a direct externality. The bene￿t (cost) to the
buyer (seller) depends directly on the investment made by the seller (buyer). It is assumed that both
v(q;!;￿;￿) and ￿c(q;!;￿;￿) are increasing in each of their arguments at a decreasing rate. The
economically interesting case is one where incentives to invest are sensitive to the expected level of
trade: vq￿(:) ￿ 0, cq￿(:) ￿ 0; and vq￿(:) ￿ 0, cq￿(:) ￿ 0. We next assume that for every !;￿;￿:
v(0;!;￿;￿) ￿ c(0;!;￿;￿) ￿ 0, i.e. the bene￿t and the cost of having no trade are both equal to
zero. This assumption formalizes the idea that the cost of the investment cannot be recouped in the
absence of trade. Assume also that hB(:) and hS(:) are increasing and convex.
2.2 Benchmark
The ￿rst best, as a benchmark, is the outcome achieved when !;￿;￿ are veri￿able and hence con-
tractible. For any given (￿;￿), let
fq
￿(!;￿;￿); p
￿(!;￿;￿) : ! 2 ￿g
be the complete contingent solution of this ￿rst best problem conditional on (￿;￿). The e¢ cient
investments (￿








￿(:);!;￿;￿)dF(!) ￿ hB(￿) ￿ hS(￿) (1)
The e¢ cient investments maximize the di⁄erence between the total expected gain and the direct cost
of investments. If both ￿ and ￿ were veri￿able, then the parties would jointly choose (￿
￿;￿￿) which
maximizes the expected net gains from the relationship.
23 An e¢ cient result
3.1 E¢ ciency and renegotiation design
We assume that, although ￿ and ￿ as well as the state of the world ! (and so v and c) are perfectly
observable by both agents, they are not veri￿able by the court. Then, the court cannot enforce
outcomes contingent on these variables, and thus parties can write only an incomplete contingent
contract (e q; e p). Consider the renegotiation stage of this initial incomplete contract where !;￿;￿; e q; e p
are all ￿xed, and suppose that
￿ Assumption 1: the buyer has all the bargaining power in the renegotiation game
Proposition 1 : Given assumption 1, there is an initial contract (e q; e p) that implements the ￿rst best
level of investments.
Proof. Given assumption 1, the buyer makes a ￿ take-it-or-leave-it￿o⁄er (q￿;p￿) in the renegoti-






s:t: : p ￿ c(q;!;￿;￿) = e p ￿ c(e q;!;￿;￿)






and p = p￿(!;￿;￿; e q; e p) = e p + c(q￿(!;￿;￿);!;￿;￿) ￿ c(e q;!;￿;￿): The buyer gets
uB = v(q
￿(:);!;￿;￿) ￿ c(q
￿(:);!;￿;￿) ￿ [e p ￿ c(e q;!;￿;￿)]
thus, the outcome of this designed game is such that the seller gets a constant payo⁄ de￿ned by the
initial contract (uS = e p￿c(e q;!;￿;￿)) and the buyer is residual claimant since she gets v(q￿(:);!;￿;￿)￿
c(q￿(:);!;￿;￿) ￿ uS, i.e. the social surplus minus a ￿xed payo⁄.
Considering the investment choice, at date 2 the seller chooses e ￿ taking the initial allocation (e q; e p)
and the buyer￿ s investment ￿ as ￿xed. The seller￿ s program is then
max
￿ U(e q; e p;￿;e ￿(e q;￿)) ￿ hS(e ￿(e q;￿))
where U(e q; e p;￿;e ￿(e q;￿)) =
R
e p ￿ c(e q;!;￿;e ￿(e q;￿))dF(!): Then e ￿ is implicitly de￿ned by








3Note that e ￿ is a function of e q and ￿. Consider now the two buyer￿ s choices: at date 0, she chooses e ￿
knowing the e⁄ect of this choice on the contract (e q; e p) she will propose to the seller at date 1. Then,





v(q￿(:);!;￿;e ￿(e q;￿)) ￿ p￿(:)dF(!) ￿ hB(￿)
s:t: : U(e q; e p;￿;e ￿(e q;￿)) ￿ hS(e ￿(e q;￿)) = US
(2)
where US is the seller￿ s reservation level of utility. As the constraint is satis￿ed as an equality at any






￿(:);!;￿;e ￿(:)) ￿ c(q
￿(:);!;￿;e ￿(:))dF(!) ￿ hS(e ￿(:)) ￿ hB(￿) ￿ US (3)
From (1) and (3), the buyer chooses ￿ = ￿
￿ at date 0.
At date 1, the buyer proposes an incentive contract (e q; e p) to the seller. As e ￿ continuously changes
with its argument, e q can be used as an instrument to implement the preferred choice of ￿. Suppose
that e q satis￿es



















￿) is continuous and increasing because of c￿q(:) < 0. Note also that e ￿(0;￿
￿) = 0 and e ￿(e q;￿
￿) >
￿￿ when e q = argmax
!
q￿(!;￿
￿;￿￿). Thus, by the intermediate value theorem there exists a quantity
e q such that e ￿(e q;￿
￿) = ￿￿. Then the ￿rst best result (￿
￿;￿￿) in the investment game is achieved.
Recall that in the Hart-Moore renegotiation procedure considered by De Fraja, both outside options
bind alternatively. When q￿ > e q, the seller￿ s outside options is binding, so she receives the same payo⁄
as if there wer no renegotiation (uS = e p ￿ c(e q;!;￿;￿)). But when q￿ < e q, the buyer￿ s outside option
is binding which makes the seller residual claimant only relative to the payo⁄the buyer gets from the
initial contract, (uS = [v(q￿(:);!;￿;￿) ￿ c(q￿(:);!;￿;￿)] ￿ [v(e q;!;￿;￿) ￿ e p]). As shown by Che, this
procedure implies that the seller￿ s marginal return is lower than the social marginal return when the
seller￿ s investment has positive externality (proposition 1).
In our setting, only the seller￿ s outside option is binding since the buyer has all the bargaining
power in the renegotiation game (renegotiation design). Thus, she renegotiates the initial quantity by
o⁄ering an optimal contract (q￿;p￿) that makes the seller indi⁄erent between trading at the e¢ cient
quantity and enforcing the initial contract (speci￿c performance). Therefore, the seller￿ s payo⁄ is
4uniquely determined by the initial contract uS = e p ￿ c(e q;!;￿;￿), and thus the externality on the
buyer￿ s outside option generates no disincentive e⁄ect. Appropriately choosing the initial quantity
e q gives the seller e¢ cient incentives to invest. Thus, the seller￿ s side of the hold-up problem is
solved. This result is related to Che ￿ s proposition 1 (which proves that De Fraja result cannot
hold) and proposition 3 (which states the su¢ cient conditions to implement the e¢ cient solution).
First, equation (4) above shows that the existence of an investment externality (v￿(:) > 0) implies
no further distorsion since it can be internalized by choosing a higher e q than in the no externality
case. That is why the second term holds as an equality, and not an inequality as in proposition 1 of
Che. Therefore, contrary to part (i) of proposition 3 of Che, there exists a contract term that yields
￿rst best outcome even when the seller￿ s investment has external e⁄ect. Moreover, in our setting an
intermediate level of e q implements the e¢ cient investment ￿￿ whatever the seller￿ s investment e⁄ect.
That is, restrictive conditions de￿ned by parts (ii) and (iii) of proposition 3 are unecessary to achieve
the e¢ cient solution.
The buyer￿ s side of the hold-up problem is solved by the combination of sequential decision mech-
anism and ex ante whole bargaining power attribution, since it allows the buyer to extract the entire
ex ante surplus by stting the initial price e p so as to make the seller￿ s ex ante participation constraint
binding.
3.2 How to design renegotiation ?
The question is how to contractually design the ex post extreme allocation of bargaining power (as-
sumption 1). Note that the initial quantity e q is not the right mechanism. Suppose that in the
renegotiation game the seller rejects any o⁄er from the buyer. Then the buyer cannot credibly threat
him to impose the initial trade (e q; e p) by demanding the speci￿c performance. Indeed, this requires a
small e q whereas seller￿ s e¢ cient investment requires a large e q. A second instrument is then necessary
to control contractually the allocation of bargaining power. Aghion et al. (1994) suggests an explicit
well-designed contract, including a ￿nancial hostage, which generates a renegotiation game satisfying
assumption 1.
4 Discussion
This paper stands in contrast to Che (2000) claim that the sequential mechanism of De Fraja (1999)
failed because parties sign a speci￿c performance contract. According to Che (2000), the seller always
underinvests with a speci￿c performance contract. Indeed, in the renegotiation game considered by
De Fraja even if the buyer￿ s outside option is binding, the seller is not residual claimant at the margin
since there is a disincentive e⁄ect through the impact the seller￿ s investment externality has on the
buyer￿ s outside option. Then, only a menu of prices can give right incentives to invest because the
buyer can be made indi⁄erent to no-trade and thus her outside option payo⁄is a constant independent
5of ￿. However, making the seller residual claimant in the renegotiation game is not the only way to give
him the right incentives to invest. Right incentives can also be provided through the e⁄ect the seller￿ s
investment has on the value of his outside option. This can be achieved with a speci￿c performance
contract if the initial contract is designed such that the seller￿ s outside option: (i) is always binding,
i.e. the whole bargaining power is allocated to the buyer, and (ii) is directly determined by the initial
contract. (i) implies that there is no disincentive e⁄ect since the buyer￿ s outside option never binds
and (ii) implies that choosing appropriately the initial quantity will give the seller the right incentives
to invest e¢ ciently. Therefore, a ￿xed quantity contract is still relevant to solve the hold-up problem
even when the investments have externalities. Achieving e¢ ciency in De Fraja (1999) speci￿cation
requires however condition (i) to be ful￿lled, that is, the possibility to allocate contractually an extreme
bargaining power.
Therefore, the reason why the sequential mechanism of De Fraja (1999) failed is the lack of rene-
gotiation design. But it is not intrinsic to the speci￿c performance contract: it is also needed in the
e¢ cient menu of prices suggested by Che, where the whole bargaining power is given to the seller
(since only the buyer￿ s outside option binds). Indeed, Che de￿ne an extreme bargaining power allo-
cation that makes the buyer￿ s outside option always binding in the menu of prices by choosing a high
enough initial price (p1 ￿ p0 > v(q￿;!;￿
￿;￿￿)).
Finally, in contrast to De Fraja (1999) we stress the complementarity between his sequential
decision mechanism and the renegotiation design mechanism. Considering sequentiality alone (De
Fraja 1999), or renegotiation design alone (Aghion et al. 1994), the ￿rst best can be achieved in
a speci￿c performance contract only if there is one-way direct externality. A combination of both
mechanisms achieves the ￿rst best in a two-sided direct externalities setting. Sequentiality (together
with ex ante full bargaining power allocation) solves one side (the buyer￿side) of the hold-up problem
by making the buyer ex ante residual claimant. Renegotiation design solves the other side (the seller￿
side) of the hold-up problem since: (i) the buyer￿ s outside option never binds and thus generates
no disincentive e⁄ect; (ii) the seller￿ s outside option is contractually designed such that he has the
right incentives to invest. Therefore, the e¢ cient result with a speci￿c performance contract requires
only two behavioral assumptions: (1) sequential investment; (2) full bargaining power allocation to
the buyer in the negotiation game (ex ante)and in the renegotiation game (ex post). Given both
assumptions, the Che-Haush (1999) result on the vanishing of contracting gains in the presence of
investment externalities does not hold.
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